Introduction
Over the past decade, violent secessionist struggles have taken place in Kosovo and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Whereas Kosovo successfully declared independence from its mother State, Serbia, in 2008, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have officially remained an integral part of their mother State, Georgia.
1 The two conflicts highlight the tension between the principle of territorial integrity on the one hand, and the need to protect minority rights on the other. Preserving the territorial integrity of mother States would lead toward denying remedial secession to struggling minority groups and arguably thereby refusing to respect minority rights. Allowing minorities to secede, in the goal ofhaving their rights to self-determination fulfilled, would lead toward disrupting the territorial integrity of mother States. How can we reconcile the principle of territorial integrity with minority rights, and in particular, with the idea of self-determination -that every "people" ought to have a nation State? 2.
Territoriality versus Minority Rights The principles of territorial integrity of States and of minority rights may seem at odds in certain situations. If the need to respect minority rights rises to the level of secession -that is, ifthe minority group's rights are being abused by the mother State, or if the minority group no longer wishes to continue its existence within the mother State for other justifiable reasons -then respect for minority rights may trump the territorial integrity of the mother State. Conversely, if the territorial integrity of the mother State is preserved at all cost, this may at times lead toward a denial of protec tions and basic rights of the minority group. According to Lea Brilmayer, "[i]f ... territorial integrity takes priority, then minority groups within the existing state will be denied their cherished claims to independence". 2 The two seemingly conflicting principles, territorial integrity and minority rights, will be examined in sections 2.1 and 2.2 below.
Territorial Integrity
The principle of territorial integrity is one of the basic tenets of international law; it is, according to Catherine Iorns, "a fundamental norm of the present world system of states and state sovereignty". Moreover, territory is one of the basic requirements of statehood. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention, an entity can achieve statehood if it fulfils four criteria: if it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into international relations.7 Statehood is a legal theory that seeks to justify its attribution on objective criteria, which are at least in theory independent from the political reality underlying many attempts at the creation of a State-like entity through secession or separation. 8 The requirement of territory is thus a basic criterion of the normative theory of statehood. A State cannot exist without a defined territory. Consequently, an attempt to disrupt State territory through the respect of minority rights via secession would violate the existing rules of State sovereignty.
4
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that " [a] ll Members shall refrain in their interna tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 5 UN Charter, Article 2(7). 6 See e.g. P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edi tion (1996) pp. 306-309 (noting that the UN Charter outlaws "all uses of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state unless authorized by the Security Council or taken in self-defense".); see also T. Farer, 'A Paradigm ofLegitimate Intervention', in L. F. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (1993) p. 316, at pp. 320-322 ("Article 2(4) prohibits force or the threat thereof against the political independence or territorial integrity of a state or for any other end inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter."). 7
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, 165 U.NT.S. 19 (1933) (hereinafter "Montevideo Convention"). 8
In fact, Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that " [t] he political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states". Montevideo Convention, ibid., Article 3.
The International Court of Justice {ICJ) has reaffirmed the principle of territo rial integrity through its protection of the principle of sanctity of borders, or uti pos sidetis. In a case concerning a border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, two African States whose boundaries had been determined by their pre-independence colonial borders, the ICJ upheld the principle of uti possidetis. The ICJ stated that this was a general principle of international law, and that "[i]ts obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratri cidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power". 9 According to the Court, the principle of uti possidetis' essence "lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved".1° The Court recognized that the prin ciple of uti possidetis may appear contradictory to the right of self-determination of peoples. However, the Court stated that the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is the wisest solution to preserve those rights that the struggling peoples have already achieved, and to prevent further chaos. "The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their indepen dence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples."
11 Under this holding of the ICJ, the principle of self-determination should be interpreted within the paradigm of the preservation of territorial status quo of existing States. In fact, African States had already adopted this view during decolonization in the 1960s. In 1964, the Organization of African Unity issued a decision which reaffirmed "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State". 12
The issue of borders and territorial integrity was recently debated during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. First, the Security Council and the European Community political bodies issued statements in 1991 reminding all parties to the conflict that changes to the existing borders (of the former Yugoslavia) could not occur by force.13 Then, in 1992, the Badinter Commission, a body of experts com missioned to answer difficult legal issues surrounding Yugoslavia's break-up, issued an opinion on the issue of borders between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herze govina.14 The Badinter Commission emphasized that, according to the ICJ ruling in the Brukina Faso v. Mali case, discussed above, the principle of uti possidetis is recognized as a general principle ofinternational law. 15 Moreover, the Badinter Com mission affirmed the existence ofthe principle of respect for the territorial status quo of existing borders, and concluded that "alteration of existing frontiers or boundaries by force is not capable of producing any legal effect". 16 According to the Badinter Commission, a secessionist claim to territory has no legal effect on the existing ter ritorial borders.17 Thus, State territorial integrity trumps minority claims for separa tion and secession.
Despite the positive law on territorial integrity discussed above, scholars have argued that the existing system ofborders and territory is morally arbitrary.
18 Accord ing to some scholars, there are no true moral justifications for the international rule that upholds the territorial integrity of presently existing States. In fact, many pres ent States acquired territory through the conquest of indigenous peoples, 19 and many post-colonial State borders were created arbitrarily, through peace treaties among former colonizers. Thus, according to these scholars, one of the primary factors dis cussed within issues of minority rights and secession is the justification of territo rial claims. "We must reinstate the human rights component of self-determination, and reinstate the belief that the state exists for the benefit of people, rather than the reverse." 20 However, the above view is not uniform among courts, scholars and certainly not State governments. The current state of international law would uphold the prin ciple of territorial integrity, and view any claim of protection of minority rights through secession with scepticism.
21 Absent extra-ordinary circumstances, territo rial integrity trumps a claim of secession by a minority group. The principle of self determination for peoples, discussed below, leads toward remedial secession only in exceptional cases.
2.2.
Minority Rights Under modern-day international law, minority groups' rights are protected from abuse by their mother States, and are guaranteed the respect of basic rights. 22 23 The Human Rights Committee issued a general comment in 1994 focus ing on Article 27, in which it concluded that States had positive obligations to pro tect minority rights. According to the Human Rights Committee, "[t]he protection of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned". 24 Moreover, minority rights are protected in the so-called "Copenhagen Document", an instru ment prepared by the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe at a 1990 meeting in Copenhagen devoted to human rights. 25 According to the Copenhagen Document, "[p]ersons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or reli gious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will". 26 Finally, minority rights are specifically protected in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a multilateral treaty resulting from the political commitments of States signatory to the Copenhagen Document. 27 The Framework Convention guarantees to persons belonging to ethnic minorities the right to equal treatment before the law, as well as rights to use their language, to develop their culture and their identity, their religion, traditions and cultural heritage.
28
In addition to minority rights that focus on the preservation ofculture, tradition, language and religion, one of the basic forms of respect for minority rights is the claim for autonomy. The term "autonomy" generally underscores a form of political or governmental autonomy. "Generally, autonomy is understood to refer to indepen dence of action on the internal or domestic level ...We regard autonomy as a relative term that describes the extent or degree of independence of a particular entity." 29 Autonomy does not imply that a territory where the minority group lives must be independent from its mother State; rather, autonomy implies a form of self-govern ment exercised by the minority group within the structure of the mother State. 30 The concept of autonomy is inherent in the infamous principle of self-determination, the idea that minority groups have a right to self-determine their political fate, despite 
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the wishes of their mother State. This article, when discussing minority rights, will specifically focus on autonomy and the right to self-determination, and will, perhaps regrettably, leave a more thorough discussion on any other forms of minority rights to other academic endeavours.
The principle of self-determination has a long history and has been used and discussed throughout the 20th century. It has evolved to be a norm of customary law, and its contours represent a wide-ranging spectrum of alternatives for the minor ity group seeking to self-determine its fate. Thus, self-determination rights for a minority group may involve simply political and representative rights within a cen tral State, on the one hand, or may amount to remedial secession and ultimately independence, on the other hand.
2.3.
History ofSelf-Determination Self-determination in international law is the legal right for a "people" 31 or a minor ity group to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign. 32 As early as 1918-1919, leaders like Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson advanced the philoso phy of self-determination, the former based on violent secession to liberate people from bourgeois governments, and the latter based on the free will of people through democratic processes.
33 Today, the principle of self-determination is embodied in Under the principle of self-determination, a group with a common identity and link to a defined territory is allowed to decide its political future in a democratic fashion. 36 For a group to be entitled to exercise its collective right to self-determina tion, it must qualify as a "people". 37 Traditionally, a two-part test has been applied to determine when a group qualifies as a people. 38 The first prong ofthe test is objective and seeks to evaluate the group to determine to what extent its members "share a common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and cultural heri tage'', as well as "territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming". 39 The second prong of the test is subjective and examines "the extent to which individuals within the group self-consciously perceive themselves collectively as a distinct 'people,' and "the degree to which the group can form a viable political entity".
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Self-determination of such groups that qualify as a people can be effectuated in different ways: through self-government, autonomy, free association or, in extreme cases, independence. Once the determination has been made that a specific group qualifies as a people and thus has the right to self-determination, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the right to self-determination creates a right to secession and 34 The term "self-determination" stems from Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, which speaks ofthe "principle of equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples". independence?f1 In other words, as mentioned above, the right to self-determination can take different forms that are less intrusive on State sovereignty than secession is. 42 Understandably, the international community views secession with suspicion, 43 and traditionally the right to independence or secession as a mode of self-determi nation has only applied to people under colonial domination or some kind of oppres sion.44 However, the modern-day international law has come to embrace the right of non-colonial people to secede from an existing State, "when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and subject to egregious abuses". 45 This right has become known as the "remedial" right to secession, and has its origin in the infa 46 mous 1920 Aaland Islands case.
The Aaland Islands were a small island group situated between Finland and Sweden, belonging administratively to the former and seeking to reunite with the latter. 47 In fact, the Aalanders claimed that they were ethnically Swedish, and that they wished to break off from Finland -which had just seceded from Russia -and to become a part of Sweden. 48 In an advisory opinion, the second Commission of Rapporteurs operating within the auspices of the League of Nations held first that this issue was properly of international, not domestic jurisdiction, and second that the Aalanders had a right to a cultural autonomy, which had to be exercised within was not considered a secession, because that term referred only to the separation from a State of a portion of its domestic territory. Moreover, the international community has also leaned on the theory of "salt-water colonialism," under which self-determination only applied to lands separated from the metropolitan mother-state by oceans or seas. .. would then force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland"). 51 "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compli ance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color." G. The above documents demonstrate the reluctance of international law to accept the right to self-determination for minority groups, absent exceptional circum stances. And, as argued above, some scholars remain sceptical of the need to disrupt territorial integrity of mother States, even in such exceptional cases. 55 
Recent Applications ofSelf-Determination Principles
Most recently, the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the right to self-determination regarding the proposed separation of Quebec from Canada. 56 Embracing the Aaland Islands precedent, the Canadian Supreme Court distinguished the right to internal self-determination from the right to external self-determination. 57 While the former refers to a level of provincial autonomy within the existing State (Canada in this instance), including political, civic, cultural, religious and social rights, the latter refers to the right to separate from the existing State in order to form a new, inde pendent State. 58 The Canadian Supreme Court, like the League of Nations, held that a people has a right to internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is not respected by the mother State, the same people's right to break off may accrue. 59 In other words, the right to separate is conditioned on the non-respect of the right to some form of provincial autonomy. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (noting that when "the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated", only then does the right to external self-determination accrue).
Recent developments in international law may also lend credence to the idea that the right to remedial secession has crystallized as a norm. As an example, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Her zegovina, and Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been denied the proper exercise of their right to democratic self-government, and, in some cases, had been subject to ethnic violence by the central government in Belgrade. 61 These authorities suggest that if a government is at the high end of the scale of representative government, the only modes of self-determination that will be given international backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and achieved by consent of all parties. If a government is extremely unrepresentative and abusive, then much more potentially destabilizing modes of self-government, including independence, may be recognized as legitimate. In the latter case, the secession ist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive external aid, and third-party states and organizations would have no duty to refrain from providing support.
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Recent examples of Kosovo and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) shed more light on the debate over territorial integrity versus minority rights and will be dis cussed below. These examples demonstrate that the winner in the battle between territoriality and minority rights may depend entirely on the political will ofthe most powerful external States. This article argues that it is the support of the powerful super-States that seems to enable minority groups to secede from their mother State. Thus, although the right to remedial secession may have crystallized into a norm of customary law academically speaking, in practice, this right accrues only if there is sufficient political support for the people at stake.
3.
l(osovo Kosovo had been an autonomous province of Serbia, one of the six republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 63 When the SFRY dissolved in the early 1990s, Kosovo remained a part of the SFRY successor, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) first, then a part of Serbia and Montenegro, and when Monte negro broke away from the latter, Kosovo remained a part of the sole Serbian State. 64 Until the late 1980s, Kosovo had the status of an autonomous province within the SFRY and exercised important regional self-governance functions. 65 More impor 61 Ibid. 74 Under the Milosevic rule, Serbia largely ignored the West and leaned on its historical ally, Russia, for support. After Milosevic was ousted from power, Serbia turned toward the West. It became clear that in order to join Western Europe -and possibly become a member ofthe European Union (EU) -Serbia had to sacrifice Kosovo, or to at least refrain from using force in order to prevent it from breaking off. 75 The relevant players, including the Serbian leadership, the Kosovar representatives, and UN and EU representatives, negotiated several times, but because of strong differences about the future of Kosovo, they were never able to reach consensus. 81 The recognition of Kosovo as a new State demonstrated the willingness of recognizing nations to respect minority rights by Kosovars at the expense of the Serbian territorial integrity. As will be discussed below, this was not the case in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), where most ofthe Western powers refuse to accept independence by the secessionist provinces at the expense of Geor gian territorial integrity. 82 In October 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the issue of the Kosovar declaration of independence. 83 More specifically, the Court was asked to opine on the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence by the provisional government of Kosovo, under international law. 84 The ICJ responded in the affirmative: that the unilateral kosovo> (comparing the loss of Kosovo for Serbia as a loss ofa "gangrenous arm" and concluding that this is a "precondition of recovery"). 78 In fact, the day after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the Serbian President, Boris Tadic, appealed to the UN Security Council to declare Kosovo's "unilateral and illegal" declaration of independence "null and void," declaration of independence was legal, as it was not prohibited by any rule ofgeneral or specialized international law. 85 The Court, however, failed to address the most difficult issue raised by the Kos ovar separation from Serbia: whether Kosovo's independence was justified under the international law principle of remedial self-determination. The Court did discuss the principle of territorial integrity. In fact, during this politically contentious case, different States presented opposing arguments to the Court on the tension between territorial integrity and self-determination. 86 Serbia and its allies argued that the prin ciple of territorial integrity, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, prohibited unilateral declarations of independence. 87 Kosovo and its supporters, on the other hand, argued that the principle of territorial integrity only applied to States, in their relations, and did not apply to non-State actors, such as the Kosovar authors ofthe declaration of independence. 88 The Court agreed with Kosovo and held that the principle of territorial integrity was confined to the sphere of inter-State relations, and that declarations of independence are questions of fact and power rather than law. 89 Thus, the Court distinguished between the principle of territorial integrity, which is a question oflaw and applies to all States in their relations, and declarations of independence, which are non-legal factual occurrences. 90
Moreover, the Court regrettably failed to opine on the legality of the declara tion of independence within the context of Security Council Resolution 1244. The Resolution affirmed a commitment to "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region". 91 Thus, Serbia argued that the declaration of independence was inconsistent with Resolution 1244, as it inherently violated the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugosla via.92 The ICJ, in what one ofthe dissentingjudges labelled as a "post-hoc intellectual construct", refused to adopt this approach and ruled instead that the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by Resolution 1244. 93 Thus, the ICJ passed up the opportunity to contribute toward resolving the tension between ter ritoriality and self-determination under international law. Judge Carn;:ado-Trinidad argued in a lengthy separate opinion that international law does provide guidance on the legality of declarations of independence, and scholars have observed that the Court could have taken up the opportunity to distinguish between the case ofKosovo Despite strong secessionist movements in these two regions, the European Union, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have refused to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent entities, and have repeatedly stated that any such attempt at independence would violate the territorial integrity of Georgia, their mother State. The United States has also refused to recognise the legitimacy of these secessionist movements, and former US envoy and renowned diplomat Richard Holbrooke stated that the conflict could encourage other separatist movements in Russia. 5 Moreover, at the annual Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly meeting in July 2008, the Assembly passed a resolution expressing concern over Russia's recent moves in breakaway Abkhazia.11 6 The resolution called on the Russian authorities to refrain from maintaining ties with the breakaway regions "in any manner that would constitute a challenge to the sovereignty ofGeorgia" and also urged Russia "to abide by OSCE standards and generally accepted international norms with respect to the threat or use of force to resolve conflicts in relations with other participating States". 117 Finally, the United Nations has reaffirmed "the commitment ofall Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders".
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Kosovo achieved independence through a secessionist struggle at the expense of the territorial integrity of Serbia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia have not been able to do so. What is different in the two cases, and more importantly can the tension between territoriality and minority rights be resolved by studying each of these cases? This issue will be explored below.
5.
Proposed Solution: Reconciling Territorial Integrity and Minority Rights in Kosovo and Georgia Kosovo represents an example of a successful secessionist struggle. To the contrary, South Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate examples of unsuccessful self-determination struggles, where a minority group is unable to achieve independence because of the primacy of the mother State's territorial integrity. First, how can the two cases be reconciled (section 5.1)? Second, how can the respect for territorial integrity of the mother State be reconciled with the need to protect minority rights, and what conclu sions can one draw from the examples of Kosovo and Georgia (section 5.2)?
5.1.
Reconciling Kosovo with Georgia: A Political Difference? The South Ossetian and Russian leadership has relied on the Kosovo precedent to argue for secession and independence from Georgia. In fact, the South Ossetian leader has recently expressed his frustration at this lack of support by the Western powers, by complaining that his country has not been able to become independent although it has a better legal case for independence than Kosovo, which did become independent.
119 Moreover, following Kosovo's declaration of independence the Rus sian Parliament released a joint statement reading: "Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an international precedent, Russia should take into account the Kosovo scenario...when considering ongoing territorial conflicts." 12°C ontrary to these asser tions, the United States State Department has consistently claimed that Kosovo is sui generis, implying that no other secessionist movements could ever rely on this prec edent.121 This article argues that the situations in Kosovo and Georgia have one major difference: the degree of involvement by the international community. Whereas in Kosovo, such involvement allowed for the transition toward independence, in Geor gia no such assistance was offered to the South Ossetians and Abkhazians. This article also argues that the international community's stance toward Kosovo and Georgia, and its different levels of involvement in the two countries, seem more dic tated by politics than by international law. 122 Scholars have argued that Kosovo, because of the particular nature of the con flict, deserves independence, unlike the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians. 123 Some scholars in particular have advanced the idea ofearned sovereignty, a conflict resolu tion theory which posits that independence-seeking entities must, as a first step, share sovereignty with their mother States. 124 According to this theory, such entities must first prove to the outside world that they are capable of functioning as an indepen dent actor, before they will accrue the right to seek independence. 125 Thus, Kosovo may be an example of an entity that first shared sovereignty with Serbia, under the Rambouillet Peace Plan and UN Resolution 1244, and that was able to subsequently demonstrate its capacity to function independently and to achieve statehood. 126 Inter national organizations play a significant role in the earned sovereignty model, by brokering deals which allow for shared sovereignty between the mother State and 120 UNOMIG, 'Recognition may come "this year," South Ossetia leader says -report ' the secessionist entity. In the case of Kosovo, the United Nations, NATO and the European Union have all been involved in this transition period. 127 The situation in Georgia has been different from Kosovo in this respect. While the international com munity has been involved in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, its role has been limited to peace keeping and negotiating peace agreements. 128 The international community in Georgia has not contributed toward a plan of shared sovereignty, nor has it been preparing South Ossetians and Abkhazians to assume independent decision-making. Rather, the stance of most international entities has been to engage in peacekeeping and to emphasize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. 129 If the inter national community is unwilling to facilitate a plan of shared sovereignty between the mother State and the secessionist entity (and often, such "facilitation" involves significant diplomatic, financial and military pressure on the mother State), then the latter may never be able to fulfil the criteria of the above-mentioned earned sover eignty theory.
Even outside of the paradigms of this theory, the simple reality may be such that the secessionist entity may never be able to gather enough political and military strength to exercise independence de facto from the mother State. Thus, without significant international involvement, most secessionist struggles will remain unsuc cessful.130 Unfortunately, international involvement in a separatist movement often has more to do with politics than the law, and the examples of Kosovo and Geor gia underscore this point. Kosovo engaged in a separatist struggle against Serbia, a country ruled by a rogue leader (Slobodan Milosevic) and labelled as the culprit in the civil war in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia.13 1 Until recently, Serbia has had very few allies on the international scene. The Kosovars, on the other hand, were able to gather the support of the international community, by emphasizing the politi cally unattractive image of Serbian leadership, by appealing to international scholars and human rights advocates, and by demonstrating that their potential independence would not disturb the geo-political equilibrium of the region. In fact, Kosovo's sep aration fragmented Serbian territory and presumably undermined the stability of The South Ossetians and the Abkhazians have faced a different situation. They are seeking to separate from Georgia, a country which has been largely supported by the Western leaders and which has been viewed as potential NATO ally in the Caucasus region. 132 Thus, disturbing the stability and territorial integrity of Georgia, a country perceived as crucial to Western democracies because of its geographic location and its role as a regional counter-weight against Russia, is an undesirable outcome for most of the Western European democracies. The fact that South Osse tia and Abkhazia are supported by Russia contributes even further to the Western unwillingness to support these provinces' secessionist struggles. 133 Most of the west ern world has feared the proliferation of Russian influence in the Caucasus; if South Ossetia and Abkhazia were to gain independence from Georgia, there is a strong pos sibility that they would become puppet States controlled by Russia.13 4 Despite the fact that these provinces function de facto independently from Georgia, the international community views this result as politically more desirable than if these provinces obtained independence and were freely able to officially align with Russia. Interna tional politics, as opposed to law, has played an enormous role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which as of now stand little chance oflegally separating from Georgia.13 5 This Article argues that their cases may not be legally different from the case of Kosovo.
Reconciling Territoriality with Minority Rights: A Proposed Solution
The examples of Kosovo and Georgia, where the notion of territorial integrity of the mother State collided with the need to respect minority rights, illustrate different approaches toward reconciling these two opposing principles. This article argues that legally the two cases are not entirely distinct and could be reconciled through the development ofa theory which would resolve situations where territoriality is at odds with minority rights. In fact, the cases of Kosovo and Georgia have produced differ ent results because ofthe different political realities surrounding these two regions.13 6 This article argues that the principle of territorial integrity may not be truly at odds with minority rights. I agree with scholars who have argued that secession ist movements almost always embrace a claim to territory which tends to be based on a historical grievance. 137 The idea of self-determination, often applied toward resolving secessionist claims, focuses on the people, and not on territory. However, a self-determination claim relying on remedial secession inherently asserts a claim to territory. As Lea Brilmayer has argued, " [w] hat are characterized as self-deter mination claims are instead sometimes simple territorial disputes".13 8 Moreover, "[a] theory of secession necessarily depends upon a theory of legitimate sovereignty over territory".13 9 Thus, minority rights in the form of a secessionist claim are in fact compatible with the principle of territorial integrity as they are both about territory. The difficult question is how, and whether, to redraw boundaries to satisfy both the mother State and the secessionist entity. Scholars have already announced principles of reconciliation, which may be helpful in the context of Kosovo and Georgia.
managed to hold on to its claim. 143 Ifa minority group has always claimed that it was illegitimately annexed by the mother State, then the argument can be made that it never agreed to the loss of its territory. Thus, it may make sense to allow it to secede and reacquire its territory. Yet another factor may be whether the disputed territory is settled predominantly by the people belonging to the secessionist minority, or if the mother State has also moved its own natives to the disputed territory. 144 The more mixed the population is in the disputed territory, the better the argument for the pres ervation of status quo. Finally, an important factor may be the nature of the historical grievance -the more heinous the historical wrongdoing toward the minority group, the better the argument that the group should separate from the mother State. 145 None of these factors are easy to apply, but at least they point us toward the rel evant inquiry of what amounts to a good secessionist claim, justifying the disruption of the mother State's territorial integrity.
When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land -or no land at all ..... When individu als seek to secede, they are making a claim to territory .... Their claim is typically centered on a piece of land that they possessed in the past, and upon which they claimed territorial integrity. Territorial integrity properly understood accommo dates the principle of self-determination. Whatever conflict exists is not between principles, but over land. 146 The application of these principles ofreconciliation between territoriality and minor ity rights to Kosovo and Georgia leads toward similar conclusions. First, both sepa ratist groups in Kosovo and in Georgia have always claimed the right to territory, and have argued for remedial secession from their mother States. 147 Thus, both of the conflicts are truly about territory, and less so about peoples. Second, both historical claims are directed toward remedying grievances from the same post-World War I era. The Kosovars were integrated into the territory of the newly created State of Yugoslavia after the break-up of Austria-Hungary in 1918, and the South Ossetians and Abkhazians became formally a part of Georgia after the creation of the Soviet Union and its annexation ofGeorgia in 1921.1 48 Third, all minority groups in question
